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clearly so holding,' the Oregon Supreme Court decided that such a pro-
vision" was broad enough to include the authority vested in the court by
the civil inspection laws. The court was influenced by Justice Cardozo's
somewhat equivocal statement in People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court,'
that "the provisions of the Civil Codes for the discovery of documents are
not rules of evidence in the strict sense. They are closely akin, however,
to such rules, for they govern and define the remedies whereby evidence
is made available."
This seemingly strained statutory construction has been rejected by the
Arizona Supreme Court.'
CONCLUSION
The defendant in a criminal case has no right to a pre-trial inspection
of the prosecution's evidence. In the majority of jurisdictions discovery is
now permitted but entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court.
In the absence of statute this discretion has been founded upon either an
unwarranted extension of the doctrine of inherent power or doubtful
statutory construction. It is now generally felt that pre-trial discovery is
a needed addition to criminal procedure, and that its application should be
extended except where the prosecution can show the likelihood of substantial
harm. But, to accomplish this, it would seem that comprehensive remedial
legislation,' rather than the development of an unworkable body of case
law founded upon questionable premises, is the better way.
DAVID 0. DEGRANDPRE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVIL INSPECTIONS*
Recent years have brought a marked increase in civil inspections.' Big
city slums, with their attendant health and safety hazards, are no new
problem, but in recent years new concern has been shown for finding some
solution to this urban blight. Some answers are spectacular, like wholesale
redevelopment; others are more prosaic, such as legislation giving public
"'Sate v. Lelanda,.10 ... ,22 .. d75 1-1
soORE. CODE A N. § 26-932 (1930) (now ORE. Rm. STAT. ch. 136, § 510 (1953)).
-245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84, 86, 52 A.L.R. 200, 206 (1927).
"State ex. rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954).
"Federal Rule 16 would serve as a useful guide, but any future legislation should
also permit discovery of expert reports, confessions, and statements of witnesses in
the hands of the prosecution.
*This Note is an outgrowth of the 1959 National Moot Court Competition, sponsored
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The hypothetical case
posed for argument raised the issues discussed herein. The joint authors of this
note, and in addition Arthur Ayers, participated in the law school intramural moot
court competition, using the same factual situation. Thereafter, the moot court
team participated in regional competition at Moscow, Idaho, and placed second.
'As used herein, "civil inspections" means those inspections conducted by state or
municipal authorities primarily to ascertain and correct a particular deplorable
situation, rather than to punish a person for a violation of the law,
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officials broad powers to make fire, health, and sanitation inspections. These
statutes and ordinances are especially characteristic of areas of large
population, but similar legislation is being adopted and enforced through-
out the nation.
A problem of current concern, more obscured than solved by a recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court,' is the extent to which such
civil inspections are governed by constitutional guarantees of freedom from
unreasonable searchs and seizures by government officials.! The purpose
of this Note is to show in the affirmative that legislation authorizing civil
inspections must contain safeguards adequate to comply with these guaran-
tees.
HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
It has been argued that the protection guaranteed by the fourth amend-
ment applies only to those searches being conducted for the purpose of
securing evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, or those searches
looking toward the forfeiture of property. In order to ascertain the nature
and scope of the protection which the framers of the Constitution intended
to flow from the fourth amendment, one must examine the historical set-
ting in which this amendment was adopted.'
"The origin of this amendment runs back in English history to the
17th century, when Charles II was placed on the throne. '"' Search war-
rants existed at this time pursuant to an act of Parliament and were used
to uncover evidence of obscene and seditious libel against the church or
state. Sporadic re-enactments by Parliament contained the use of search
warrants until the latter half of the 18th century when they began to be
contested. In 1765 the case of Entick v. Carrington' brought forth a judicial
attack on the use of general warrants7 and resulted in the formulation of
certain fundamental piinciples that were later formed into constitutional
guarantees.
The Entick case was an action of trespass brought against Messengers
to the King for the search of John Entick's house and the carrying away
of certain papers and pamphlets. The Messengers defended their action
on the ground that it was done pursuant to a general warrant. Lord Cam-
den, Lord Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas, condemned the use of general
'Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
"'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
'In Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 95 (1900), Mr. Justice White stated: "The
necessities which gave birth to the Constitution, the controversies which precedel
its formation, and the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption, may
properly be taken into view for the purpose of tracing to its source any particular
provision of the Constitution, in order thereby to be enabled to correctly interpret its
meaning."
'2 WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1414 (1910).
'19 Howell's State Trials, col. 1029 (1765).
'As used herein, "general warrants" means those warrants issued without particular-
ly naming the place to be searched or the persons or things to be seized.
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warrants because they were an unreasonable means of invading the person's
right to be secure in his property. The basis of this right of security was
set forth as follows: "By the laws of England, every invasion of private
property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon
my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action, though the
damage be nothing .... If he admits the fact, he is bound to shew by way
of justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused him." It
is this principle which is at the very core of the protection to be afforded
by the fourth amendment.!
At about the same time that general warrants were prevalent in Eng-
land, similar proceedings were taking place in the American colonies. Writs
of Assistance were being used to discover smugglers and to confiscate their
goods. These writs in their nature resembled the general warrants used in
England and were good in the hands of any officer. James Otis, who was
the Advocate-General of the Crown in Boston, made a vigorous protest
against their use, claiming that it was tyranny." He said :'
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty is the
freedom of one's home. A man's house is his castle and whilst he
is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if
it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege.
Custom-house officers may enter our houses when they please; we
are commanded to permit their entry. Their menial servants may
enter, may break locks, bars, and everything in their way; and
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no count,
can inquire.
A perusal of this quotation and the previous quotation from Lord
Camden shows that the principles laid down therein were not limited to
the situation involving enforcement of criminal law, and that in the period
immediately before the adoption of our Constitution there was great re-
sentment both in the American colonies and in England against arbitrary
invasion of a man's home by government officials. It cannot be doubted
that the framers of our Constitution were aware of the fact that in order
to have a free nation with liberty and justice for all, arbitrary govern-
mental invasions, for whatever purpose, of the individual's right to be
secure in his home must be restricted. It was intended that by adopting
the fourth amendment to the Constitution, every person was guaranteed
this right.
FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY SEARCH UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Although the first eight amendments to the United States Constitution
restricted only the federal government, many rights guaranteed therein
8Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials, col. 1029, 1066 (1765).
""As every American statesman, during our revolutionary ... period . . . was un-
doubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom [Camden's opinion], and
considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be
confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed
the Fourth Amendment .. " Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886).
'o2 WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1415 (1910).
"Id. at 1417-18.
1960] NOTES
3
Angel and Corontzos: Constitutionality of Civil Inspections
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1959
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
are implicit "in the concept of ordered liberty"' and thus constitute
restraints upon state power and action also, through the vehicle of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court in
Wolf v. Colorado' accepted as elementary that the security against arbi-
trary intrusion by governmental officials into one's privacy, which is the
heart of the fourth amendment, is enforceable against the states through
the due process clause. The Court said that "were a State affirmatively to
sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment."1
Under its facts the Wolf case dealt with an unreasonable intrusion into
an individual's home by police officers seeking evidence of crime. If the
meaning of the statements in the case is limited to their terms and to the
facts there involved, it relates only to arbitrary invasions by the police
seeking to enforce criminal law. But surely no one would seriously contend
that the search would be any the less objectionable if made by a public
official other than a police officer. A seemingly more reasonable dis-
tinction may be advanced that the constitutional guarantee which is part
of "the concept of ordered liberty" protects against arbitrary intrusion
to enforce criminal law, with its attendant penalties, but not against a
similar intrusion to enforce civil regulations for public safety, where pro-
tection of the public instead of punishment of the culprit is the objective.
But this position is also unjustifiable. If due process prevents a state from
affirmatively sanctioning an unreasonable invasion into the privacy of a
suspected criminal, then every person should be entitled to this minimal
protection.
The Wolf case was not intended to exclude all but criminals from this
application of the due process clause. There is historical justification for
the belief that in its'inception the Constitution was intended to safeguard
the privacy of all men. And in argument, in the Wolf decision the Court,
citing Davidson v. New Orleans,' pointed out: "The real clue to the prob-
lem confronting the judiciary in the application of the Due Process Clause
is not to ask where the line is once and for all to be drawn but to recog-
nize that it is for the Court to draw it by the gradual and empiric process
of 'inclusion and exclusion.' "' It should be emphasized that the Wolf
case was an exercise of the process of "inclusion" whereby the due process
clause was extended to include restrictions on states intruding into the
privacy of a home. Nothing in the case suggests that this was an attempt to
define the maximum limits for the enforcement of this right against the
states. To the contrary, the Court recognized that the concept of due process
is dynamic and expanding, and its application to the states cannot once
and for all be defined.
It is submitted that the restraints which under the fourth and four-
teenth amendments are imposed on federal and state police in the enforce-
"Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
'5338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
'Id. at 28.
9 :. U.S. 97 (1877).
"'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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ment of criminal law should as well be extended to any other federal or
state officials, even though their action be in the enforcement of civil in-
spection laws.
CASE LAW
Although federal case law is sparse, the early reported cases tend to
support the proposition that the search and seizure provisions of the fourth
amendment apply only to searches made with a view to criminal or quasi-
criminal prosecution. In the case of In re Meador," the court, holding the
prohibitions of the fourth amendment on the issuance of warrants not ap-
plicable to certain revenue cases, said, "but this is a civil proceeding, and
in no wise does it partake of the character of a criminal prosecution; no
offense is charged against the Meadors. Therefore, in this proceeding, the
fourth amendment is not violated." Similarly, In re Strouse held that the
fourth amendment is applicable only to criminal cases. The Supreme Court
of the United States indirectly dealt with this problem in an early landmark
decision.' The Court stated that proceedings instituted for the purpose
of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses com-
mitted by him are in their nature criminal proceedings, and for that reason
within the fourth amendment. This holding strongly suggests that had the
court found the proceeding to be civil in nature, the fourth amendment
would have afforded no protection. However, there have been more recent
cases in which the fourth amendment has been held applicable to civil pro-
ceedings.'
The recent cases have dealt principally with the right of public officials
to make health and safety inspections. In support of the argument that such
inspections are invalid, the common contention was that, in the absence of
a clear emergency, the requirement of a search warrant could not be con-
stitutionally dispensed with. In District of Columbia v. Little' a health
regulation authorizing inspections without a warrant was attacked as un-
constitutional. The homeowner refused to unlock his door to an inspector
and was convicted of a misdemeanor, under the statute, for interfering with
the inspection. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that in the ab-
sence of an emergency a magistrate must authorize the inspection. In answer
to the argument that only searches for evidence of crime are within the
purview of the fourth amendment, the majority of the court stated that
such a proposition was wholly without merit and in fact preposterous. The
dissent, however, argued that the fourth amendment was intended to apply
only to criminal or quasi-ciimilna proceedings. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the constitutional issue was avoided, the Court affirming on other
grounds.
The most significant decision to date concerning the constitutionality of
16 Fed. Cas. 1294 (No. 9375) (N.D. Ga. 1869).
1823 Fed. Cas. 261 (No. 13548) (D. Nev. 1871).
"Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
"See Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924) ; Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff''d on other grounds,
339 U.S.1 (1950).
"Supra note 20.
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a civil inspection statute is the recent case of Frank v. Maryland." While the
decision leaves some important issues to conjecture, it does answer other
equally important questions. The statute involved provided that when a
health inspector had cause to suspect that a nuisance existed in a house,
he could demand entry in the daytime, and if the owner or occupant re-
fused entry, he was subject to a fine. The defendant refused to permit
a city health inspector, who had cause to suspect that the defendant's base-
ment was infested with rats, to inspect without a warrant. In a five to four
decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,
but it seems clear that the decision was not based on the argument that
the fourteenth amendment offers protection against unreasonable searches
only in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. In fact, the Court indicated
that the extent to which the essential right of privacy is protected by the
due process clause is not restricted within historic bounds. It is thus probably
true that the fourth amendment was originally intended to, and will prob-
ably today be considered to, extend to civil inspection as well as to criminal
search.
The foregoing conclusion, however, does not thereby bar inspections
made without a warrant; it only requires that they conform to a standard
similar to that required of criminal searches-that they be reasonable.'
In Rabinowitz v. United States, a criminal prosecution, the Court stated
that what constitutes a reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula, but rather depends on a consideration of all the facts and
circumstances involved. This rule is consistent with the well established
proposition that constitutional safeguards are not absolute and must some-
times yield to a greater public interest. In the Frank case although the
Court avoided directly answering the question whether civil inspections
are governed by the Federal Constitution, their language intimates that
they are so governed, and the Court did decide that the inspection com-
plied with the Constitution, nevertheless, in that it was reasonable under
the circumstances.' The majority of the Court balanced the relative in-
terests involved-the right and duty of the state, under its police power,
to legislate in the interest of public health and safety as opposed to the
individual's right of privacy.
The principle that emerges from the Frank decision may be stated
generally as follows: Civil inspections without a warrant as an adjunct
-359 U.S. 360 (1959).
"See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192 (1927) ; Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
'See State v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958), prob. jurig. noted sub
noin., Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959). This case is presently pending before
the Supreme Court and involves essentially the same issues presented in the Frank
case. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld a statute authorizing health Inspections
without a warrant. The four dissenting justices in the Frank case voted to note
probable jurisdiction, while the majority justices voted contrary with the excep-
tion of Mr. Justice Stewart who abstained because his father is a member of the
court from which the case was appealed. If no changeover occurs, the decision
will be affirmed. One obvious difference exists between the statutes involved in
these two cases. In the Frank case, the inspection was conducted for the purpose
of detecting a suspected nuisance. In the Price case, the inspection was merely
periodic In nature. However, the fact that none of the majority justices in Frank
voted to note jurisdiction tends to indicate that the distinction is unimportant.
[Vol. 21,
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to a regulatory scheme for the general welfare and not as a means of en-
forcing the criminal law axe not violative of constitutional rights, provided
the inspection is reasonable and is accompanied by certain minimum
safeguards. Recognizing the impracticality of requiring a search warrant
for the inspection involved, the Court said :'
Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to
inspect dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-
area search, or as here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispens-
able importance to the maintenance of community health; a power
that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the
safeguards necessary for a search for evidence of criminal acts.
MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS NECESSARY TO THE VALIDITY
OF INSPECTION STATUTES
The Frank decision should not, however, be construed as approving any
and all civil inspections made without a warrant in the name of public
health and safety. Although a warrant may not be required, civil inspections
are nevertheless subject to the fourth amendment provisions as applied
throught the fourteenth amendment. The authorizing legislation must pro-
vide adequate safeguards to the individual so as to preclude inspections of
a harassing or oppressive nature. The safeguards provided by the statute
involved in the Frank case were held to be sufficient and included the
following: The inspection could be made only in the daytime; the in-
spector must have had cause to suspect the existence of a nuisance in the
home; the inspector was not authorized to force entry. In view of the fact
that the Court was divided five to four, the statute apparently came danger-
ously close to unconstitutionality. This suggests that the safeguards pro-
vided by that statute should be considered as minimal. The advisability of
incorporating additional safeguards in future legislation and amending ex-
isting legislation is obvious. Not only would constitutionality be more
certain, but the additional concern for the convenience of the individual
would tend to discourage litigation. As a consequence, efficient administra-
tion of the inspection program would be realized.
Provisions in addition to those provided in the statute involved in the
Frank case might wisely include the following: The inspector must present
identifying credentials to the individual whose home is to be inspected; the
inspector must give prior notice to the homeowner that his dwelling is to
be inspected; no inspection should be authorized for the purpose of gather-
ing evidence of crime without the procurement of a valid search warrant;
repeated inspections with a view to harassing the homeowner should be
unauthorized; in the absence of an emergency, inspections should be re-
stricted to certain specified hours.
The inspection of dwellings by health and safety officers has become
increasingly important to community welfare. As communities grow, so will
health and safety problems. The inspection system is recognized as the most
desirable preventive weapon available to meet these problems. In view of
2359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959).
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the Frank decision its use can be expected to increase considerably in the
future. Although this procedure is available to meet community health and
safety problems, care must be taken in drafting authorizing legislation so
as not to encroach unreasonably on the individual's right of privacy. Though
some general guides have been noted and suggested, the allowable limits of
such legislation is still a matter of conjecture.
CHARLES F. ANGEL
THEODORE CORONTZOS
THE GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The only safe generalization which can be made as to the re-
quirements of good-faith bargaining is that it is risky to general-
ize. The courts and the Board have made it abundantly clear that
the determination of whether there has been compliance with the
obligation to bargain in good faith, depends ultimately on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case.'
ORIGIN OF THE REQUIREMENT- THE WAGNER ACT
In section 8(5) of the Wagner (National Labor Relations) Act Con-
gress imposed the duty upon employers covered by the law to bargain col-
lectively with the lawful representatives of their employees.! The Act did
not define "collectively bargaining" but left it up to the National Labor
Relations Board, which the Act had created, to work this out within the
broad scope of the agency's authority to carry out the policies of the Act.
It became obvious to the Board at an early date that the goal of industrial
peace would be frustrated if the obligation of bargaining collectively could
be satisfied by the employer coming to the bargaining table and only going
through the motions without any intention of reaching an agreement. To
overcome this obstacle the Board introduced the requirement of good faith.
The duty to bargain collectively, which the Act imposes upon em-
ployers . . . is not limited to the recognition of employees' repre-
sentatives qua representatives, or to a meeting and discussion of
terms with them. The duty encompasses an obligation to enter into
discussion and negotiation with an open and fair mind and with a
sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement concerning the issues
presented. . ..
This statutory interpretation by the Board of the meaning of the duty
'McLean.Arkansas Lumber Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1036-37 (1954).
249 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
3Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1248 (1939), enforced, 110 F.2d 632
(4th Cir. 1940). See also 84 N.L.R.B 744 (1949), enforcement denied, 184 F.2d
98 (4th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 322 (1951).
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